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There is only one piece of federal legislation in the United States that 
explicitly regulates in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), called the United States 
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act, which lays out success 
rate reporting requirements. Other pieces of federal legislation relate only 
tangentially to assisted reproduction or fertility clinics, which leads to 
redundancy and gaps in regulation, and, therefore, greater costs to 
consumers seeking service in the assisted reproduction market. 
This paper will review how the current state of legislative redundancy 
and gaps creates negative incentives for assisted reproduction providers and 
poses risks for their customers of their services. I argue that the United 
States should adopt a regulatory scheme over the assisted reproduction 
market that is of similar rigor to the Human Fertilisation and Embrology 
Act scheme in the United Kingdom. By reviewing the process of assisted 
reproduction (specifically, in vitro fertilization), the risks to which patient-
consumers are exposed, the lack of remedy in the current legal landscape, 
and the successes of the Human Fertilisation and Embrology Authority of 
the United Kingdom, I will show that legislation on assisted reproduction 
will help improve the protections for customers in the assisted reproduction 
market of the United States. 
The executive director of the Center for Genetics and Society, Marcy 
Darnovsky, called the United States “the wild west of the fertility industry,” 
a sentiment echoed by many others in the field.1 Because fertility touches 
on conception and embryos, which can be hot-button political issues, 
lawmakers have been resistant to touch it.2 Assisted Reproductive 
                                                          
 1 Michael Ollove, Lightly Regulated In Vitro Fertilization Yields Thousands of Babies 
Annually, THE WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/health-science/lightly-regulated-in-vitro-fertilization-yields-thousands-of-babies-
annually/2015/04/13/f1f3fa36-d8a2-11e4-8103-fa84725dbf9d_story.html?utm_term=
.7cafd4cd9bcf. For an article that describes effects that an absence of regulation has on the 
assisted reproduction market in terms of embryo storage, see Ariana Eunjung Cha, The 
Struggle to Conceive with Frozen Eggs, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 27, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/01/27/feature/she-championed-
the-idea-that-freezing-your-eggs-would-free-your-career-but-things-didnt-quite-work-
out/?utm_term=.4de8addcd606.   
 2 Michael Ollove, States Not Eager to Regulate Fertility Industry, THE PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/3/18/states-not-eager-to-regulate-fertility-industry. See also 
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Technology (“ART”), is a booming field: “[t]he number of IVF cycles done 
in the United States increased by 28% from 2003 to 2012, and that rising 
trend has spiked in recent years.”3 About twelve percent of women have 
used ART, and about 1.5 percent of American children are conceived 
through ART.4 
The World Health Organization defines infertility as “a disease of the 
reproductive system defined by the failure to achieve a clinical pregnancy 
after [twelve] months or more of regular unprotected sexual intercourse[],” 
for which “access to . . . care falls under the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disability.”5 Yet, ART coverage is not mandated under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, despite requiring coverage for 
both infant care and maternity care.6 Without the standards and oversight of 
either the insurance industry or the federal government, ART consumers are 
at the mercy of opportunistic providers. 
Customers of ART are uniquely vulnerable, and deserve a market with 
thorough and unbiased oversight. The drive to reproduce is a powerful force 
for all people, and “the mere fact that so many infertile couples desperately 
seek reproductive technology . . . speaks to the centrality of procreation as a 
source of spiritual fulfillment for many people.”7 But, unfortunately, many 
couples are unable to have children for a variety of reasons. 
Adoption is not always an adequate alternative for infertile couples. 
For almost all people there is a strong emotional longing for genetically 
related children.8 ARTs are a powerful advance in medicine that provide 
hope for childless couples. Unfortunately, in the United States, there is no 
uniform federal legislation that mandates how these treatments are 
administered, to whom they are available, how much they will cost, or even 
what clinics may perform them.9 There is no body that ensures uniform care 
                                                                                                                                      
Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 164 (2017) (noting that the 
historical stigma of infertility has contributed to a lack of federal regulation). 
 3 Ellie Kincaid, A Booming Medical Industry in the U.S. is Almost Totally Unregulated, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (July 7, 2015, 3:50pm), https://www.businessinsider.com/assisted-
reproduction-ivf-industry-regulation-2015-6. 
 4 Ollove, supra note 1. 
 5 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Sexual and Reproductive Health: Infertility 
Definitions and Terminology, http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/infertility/
definitions/en/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2017). 
 6 See The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1), which 
lists the “Essential Health Benefits” that every insurer must provide under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
 7 Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to In Vitro 
Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792, 2805 (2005). (hereinafter Assessing the Viability). 
 8 John D. Ingram, Should In Vitro Fertilization Be Covered by Medical Expense 
Reimbursement Plans? 7 AM. J. FAMILY L. 103 (1993). 
 9 See M. Elliott Neal, Protecting Women: Preserving Autonomy in the 
Commodification of Motherhood, 17 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 611, 625 (2011) 
(noting that states have attempted to compensate for the lack of federal legislation). 
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from clinic to clinic, oversees the billing processes of those clinics, or 
issues licenses to administer ART to patients.10 
In the United Kingdom, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
(“HFE Act”) authorized the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
(“HFEA”) to oversee accounts, record activities of fertility clinics in the 
United Kingdom, and issue licenses for providing ART treatment.11 In other 
developed countries, more infertile couples are able to take advantage of 
IVF advances because of reimbursement and coverage schemes.12 Infertile 
Americans–as consumers of ART services–deserve better protections, and 
American insurers–as potential cost-bearers for IVF care–deserve better 
predictability. 
Because there is inadequate federal oversight13 and because IVF injury 
often falls through the cracks of traditional medical malpractice regimes,14 
consumers lack sufficient protection, and insurance providers have 
difficulty structuring coverage for IVF, if they offer coverage at all. Private 
regulators, pricing schemes, and the existing legislation create adverse 
incentives for providers,15 and the childless couples for whom these 
services provided hope are the ones who suffer. In vitro fertilization is the 
most common (and one of the most invasive) forms of ART,16 and will be 
the vehicle through which this note explores a regulatory framework. An 
appropriate framework will create oversight over clinic certification, 
offered procedures, and clinic standards, and will create a process for 
reprimanding providers that violate the standards. 
                                                          
 10 See Alicia Ouellette et al., Lessons Across the Pond: Assisted Reproductive 
Technology in the United Kingdom and the United States, 31 AM. J. L. & MED. 419, 420 
(2005) (“U.S. law does not require licensing or accreditation of infertility programs and few 
regulations govern embryo research.”). 
 11 See Human Embryology and Fertilisation Act of 1990 (“HFE Act”), §§ 6(1), 8(a) & 
12. See Ouellette, supra note 10, at 422 (“In addition [to licensing], the HFEA produced a 
Code of Practice with guidelines on licensed activities,
 
and keeps a register of information 
on donors, treatments, and children born through ART. It also publicizes its role, gives 
advice and information, and reviews new developments in the field.”). 
 12 Katherine E. Abel, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Insurance Coverage for 
Infertility Treatment: an Inconceivable Union, 37 CONN. L. REV. 819, 822 (2005). 
 13 See David Adamson, Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technologies in the United 
States, 39 FAM. L. Q. 727, 731 (2005)(“[T]he Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification 
Act of 1992 (FCSRCA). . . required the following: annual reporting of clinic-specific 
success rates, listing of clinics that do not report, development of a model program for 
certification of embryo laboratories, and promulgation of criteria and procedures for 
approval of accreditation programs to inspect and certify embryology laboratories.”). 
 14 See Fox, supra note 2, at 165-66 (“[T]he malpractice tort usually affords recovery 
only in cases like this one, in which a plaintiff suffers physical injury. Medical malpractice 
actions in particular tend to require proof of bodily harm that is missing in many devastating 
cases of reproductive negligence.”). 
 15 See generally Thomas H. Murray, Money-Back Guarantees for IVF: An Ethical 
Critique, 25 J. OF L., MED. & ETHICS 292, 293 (1997). 
 16 Abel, supra note 12, at 821. 
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II. THE PROCESS OF IVF 
Alternative Reproductive Technology to treat infertility is not a 
journey one would embark upon lightly. IVF is the most commonly used 
medical procedure to treat infertility.17 During in vitro fertilization: 
[t]he ovaries are artificially stimulated by hormones in order to 
produce more than one mature egg during the menstrual cycle, and 
then the eggs are removed from the ovaries using a needle-like 
instrument. One or more eggs are then fertilized in an artificial 
medium, such as a petri dish, using the husband’s or a donor’s 
sperm, and the eggs remain in this medium until they become 
fertilized and multiply into eight cells to become an embryo. These 
embryos are then reimplanted into the woman’s uterus.
 
Frequently a 
number of the embryos will be cryopreserved, or frozen, for future 
IVF attempts if the first treatment fails.18 
The process is invasive, arduous, and intimidating for the vulnerable 
couples who seek it. In addition to the large medical risk to which IVF 
patients are exposed, there also is a “risk that emotionally vulnerable 
infertile couples may be exploited by opportunistic IVF providers.”19 ART 
customers need a guarantee of a standard of treatment available at any 
clinic from which they might seek service. Consumers also need assurance 
that ART providers will be more concerned with their health (and the health 
of their fetus) than the clinic’s success rate. 
Finding an ART provider is as simple as a Google search. The phrase 
“how to find an IVF clinic” returns dozens of different clinics, boasting 
great success rates, money-back guarantees, and zero-down payments. But 
it is difficult to know which is the best option. By scrolling a bit further, a 
hopeful ART customer might find the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s ART Success Rates page.20 Visitors can enter a zip code or 
state, and find the success rates, contact information, and clinic services 
available from those clinics.21 Patient demographic information is limited to 
age and diagnosis.22 The website does not provide information on 
malpractice suits, adverse health outcomes, or on financing. 
                                                          
 17 See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated 
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 608 (2003). Other forms of ART include 
Artificial Insemination, which “requires the least technological sophistication,” and Gamete 
Intrafallopian Transfer, “which delivers the sperm and harvested eggs . . . directly into the 
woman’s fallopian tube . . . requiring the use of a laparoscope.” 
 18 Abel, supra note 12, at 821. 
 19 Assessing the Viability, supra note 7, at 2792. 
 20 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, ART SUCCESS RATES, 
https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/index.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2017). The most recent 
clinic data available is from 2015. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
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Further, as technology advances, consumers of ART services need 
assurance that procedures physicians are providing have been thoroughly 
reviewed and tested for safety and effectiveness. As it stands, “The 
government plays essentially no role in reviewing new medical procedures . 
. . leaving the task of scrutinizing the safety and effectiveness of innovative 
techniques for biomedical researchers and professional self-regulation[.]”
23 
Researchers and professional self-regulators have different incentives than 
government regulators. Because they lack enforcement power over ART 
providers, they are unable to ensure public safety or health. This is not to 
say that they are malicious, but that they lack the capacity to appropriately 
protect ART consumers, who are vulnerable because of the emotional 
difficulty of infertility and lack of legal recourses, from opportunistic 
providers. 
III. THE EFFECT 
The range of harms that an ART consumer can experience when 
undergoing IVF treatment is staggering, and the lack of consumer 
protections exacerbates the potential harms. There are common errors, 
explored below, caused by many careless ART providers, but there are also 
cases of exceptional harm, which, as a matter of public health, we have an 
interest in preventing. 
A. Multi-Fetal Pregnancy 
When only one embryo is implanted, the chances for a successful 
pregnancy are only forty to fifty percent.24 Because the United State places 
no limits on the number of embryos implanted in an IVF patient, and many 
ART providers implant several, the chances of multi-fetal pregnancies are 
greater.25 The United States has a higher rate of multi-fetal pregnancy and 
preterm births than countries that provide insurance for IVF and place 
limits on embryonic transfer.26 An Institute of Medicine report from 2006 
noted that preterm births cost the United States $26 billion, mostly in 
medical care, and hospitals are generally not able to recover their 
expenses.27 Fertility clinics want to appear successful, and bear none of the 
                                                          
 23 Noah, supra note 17, at 618. 
 24 Camille M. Davidson, Octomom and Multi-Fetal Pregnancies: Why Federal 
Legislation Should Require Insurers to Cover in Vitro Fertilization, 17 WM. & MARY J. OF 
WOMEN & L. 135, 151(2010). 
 25 Most Fertility Clinics Break the Rules, MSNBC.COM (Feb. 20, 2009), 
http://www.msnbc.com/id/29305552/ (“[For] women under 35, government records show 
that just 83 of 426 clinics followed the [SART] guidance calling for one and no more than 
two embryos. The average for fresh embryos (as opposed to frozen) implanted in women in 
that age group ranged from a 1.4 to 4.8. The vast majority of the clinics averaged between 
two and three embryos.”). 
 26 Davidson, supra note 24 at 149-50. See also Abel, supra note 12 at 822. 
 27 Id. at 148 and 139. 
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costs associated with multi-fetal pregnancies, so there is no incentive for 
them to stop multi-embryonic transfer.28 Rather, they congratulate their 
customers’ pregnancy, and report another successful pregnancy. 
Patients who undergo multi-fetal pregnancies experience a higher risk 
of ectopic pregnancy, gestational diabetes, and preeclampsia.29 Older 
patients, in particular, are more likely to suffer damage to their 
cardiovascular and renal systems.30 Parents of multiple children suffer 
psychological harm and fatigue, and are more likely to suffer “depression, 
alcohol and drug abuse, and divorce.”31 
The risks posed by multi-fetal pregnancies are not limited to the 
consumer. They put the ultimate product of the service, the fetus, in danger. 
Twins are born prematurely fifty-one percent of the time, and triplets are 
born prematurely ninety-one percent of the time.32 (For context, single-fetus 
pregnancies only end in premature labor 9.4 percent of the time).33 Preterm 
babies are usually low-weight, which increases medical care costs during 
their first year of life, and increases risk of death or serious disability later 
in life.34 Moreover, the risk of major birth defects is higher among children 
born from multi-fetal pregnancies.35 Those defects can include “blindness, 
brain damage, and respiratory problems.”36 Additionally, children born 
through IVF may suffer “higher blood pressure, adiposity, glucose levels, 
and . . . vascular abnormalities[.]”37 
B. Laboratory Mix-Ups 
Currently, ART labs have no special licensing requirements.38 The 
most common harms caused by IVF are mix-ups, including “mishandl[ing] 
sperm, eggs, or embryos . . . fertiliz[ing] eggs with strangers’ sperm or 
implant[ing] embryos into the wrong person.”39 Though the phrase “mix-
up” sounds lighthearted, the trauma of having an ART provider implant the 
wrong reproductive material into an ART consumer should not be 
understated. A study of ART labs in the United States showed “more than 
                                                          
 28 Noah, supra note 17 at 626. 
 29 See generally id. at 620-22. 
 30 Assessing the Viability, supra note 7, at 2810 (Internal quotation marks omitted). 
 31 Davidson, supra note 24, at 149. Internal quotation marks omitted. 
 32 Davidson, supra note 24 , at 147. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See generally id. at 147-49. Davidson also notes that children born through IVF (but 
not necessarily a multi-fetal pregnancy) are more likely to suffer cardiovascular, urogenital, 
and musculoskeletal defects than children conceived naturally. 
 35 Noah, supra note 17, at 620-22. 
 36 Note, Assessing the Viability, supra note 7, at 2809-10. 
 37 Honor Whiteman, IVF: Risks May Outweigh Benefits, Say Experts, MEDICAL NEWS 
TODAY (Jan. 29, 2014). https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/271785.php. 
 38 Ouellette, supra note 10 at 429. 
 39 Fox, supra note 2 at 193-94. 
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one in five report errors in diagnosing, labeling, and handling donor 
samples[,] and embryos for implantation.”40 The rate of these mix-ups is 
unacceptably high considering the financial and emotional stakes of IVF. 
Though ART laboratories have to be certified by the American 
College of Pathologists,41 the standards they have to meet are general, and 
do not capture the needs an ART laboratory may have. The Centers for 
Disease Control’s (“CDC”) model laboratory program envisioned by the 
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act42 was never adopted 
across the United States, and neither performance criteria nor approval 
standards were issued.43 A lab in California had mold in the area where 
embryos were stored and was “cited for not properly training staff and 
storing drugs.”44 
IV. PHYSICAL INJURIES 
Unfortunately, when undergoing IVF procedures (or other procedures 
meant to facilitate pregnancy) ART customers often suffer physical harm. 
In an article on physician probation, Consumer Reports highlights Dr. 
Leonard Kurian of southern California, who “removed the wrong ovary 
from a 37-year-old woman . . . .”45 The California State Medical Board 
found that he “[f]ailed to provide her informed consent,” and failed to use 
“a detailed history and physical exam to formulate a . . . plan of 
treatment.”46 Kurian treated another woman without having a history of 
previous pregnancies, a list of her medications, or a family history.47 On a 
different woman, Kurian performed a labiaplasty without sufficient 
knowledge or training.48 
Malissa Pineda went to Dr. Rifaat Salem because of his success rate, 
but her experience was hardly happy and successful.49 After implanting 
                                                          
 40 Id. at 152. 
 41 Ollove, supra note 1. 
 42 See U.S. Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act, 42 U.S.C. § 263 
(hereinafter “FSCRCA”). 
 43 Adamson, supra note 13, at 732. 
 44 Bernice Yeung & Jonathan Jones, When Pregnancy Dreams Become IVF Nightmares, 
REVEAL NEWS, (Jun. 01, 2017), https://www.revealnews.org/article/when-pregnancy-
dreams-become-ivf-nightmares/. 
 45 Rachel Peachman, What You Don’t Know About Your Doctor Could Hurt You, 
CONSUMER REPORTS, (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/health/doctors-
and-hospitals/what-you-dont-know-about-your-doctor-could-hurt-you/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/SW8P-ZPPF]. 
 46 Leonard Sunil Kurian, Case No. 05-2011-214708. ¶ 42 (1-2) (Med. Bd. of Cal. Dep’t 
of Consumer Affairs Apr. 8, 2014) (first amended accusation). 
 47 Id. at ¶ 28 (1). 
 48 Id. at ¶ 77 (1). 
 49 Yeung, supra note 44. Salem’s aberrant behavior is well-documented in a 
constellation of suits. See First Amended Complaint for Rodriguez v. Salem, BC626618 
(Super. Ct. Cal. 2017); Said v. Salem, PC040905 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 2008); Young v. Salem, YC 
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three embryos in Pineda and instructing her to stay on bed rest, Salem asked 
her to come back into the office.50 His embryologist explained that there 
was an error with her embryos, and Salem asked if they wanted to have the 
embryos out that day or the next day.51 He did not explain what procedure 
would get them out, and did not get Pineda’s informed consent.52 
Pineda described feeling a “painful scraping” when she was having the 
embryos removed, which was a dilation and curettage, an abortive 
procedure.53 As a result of the procedure, Pineda “started having fits of rage 
and anger. She was crying all the time. She couldn’t sleep. She did her best 
to push those feelings out of her mind because she believed staying positive 
would help her get pregnant more easily.”54 The trauma she experienced 
caused anxiety, poor memory, and panic attacks.55 
While Malissa Pineda’s story is an extreme example, it is not 
completely anomalous. At least one other woman alleged that Salem had 
performed a similar “follow-up surgery” on her.56 If you find the current 
state of IVF in the United States shocking, it can be explained by the 
business-oriented development of ART in the United States, the lack of 
uniform and comprehensive federal oversight, and the inadequacy of the 
legal system to respond to ART harm. 
V. THE CURRENT (LACK OF) FEDERAL REGULATION 
The ART field in the United States is “a field characterized by strong 
anti-regulatory sentiment because it evolved as a business, not a research 
enterprise. . . .”57 This resistance, coupled with the fact that reproduction is 
a political lightning rod,58 means there is only one piece of legislation that 
explicitly calls out IVF providers.59 The United States Fertility Clinic 
Success Rate and Certification Act (“FCSRCA”), passed in 1992, requires 
only that fertility clinics report their rate of successful pregnancies to 
                                                                                                                                      
050743 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 2005); Complaint, Domingo v. Rosenberg, BC563660 (Super. Ct. Cal. 
2008). 
 50 Yeung & Jones, supra note 44. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. See also Said v. Salem, PC040905 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 2008). 
 57 Ollove, supra note 1. 
 58 Ollove, supra note 2 (Pew Charitable Trusts). 
 59 There are other federal healthcare programs that can affect ART providers, but they 
are not uniform, and can lead to redundancy and confusion. See Davidson, supra note 24, at 
728 (noting that the Federal Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act of 1988 governs labs that 
test hormones, the National Institutes of Health regulates funding, the Food and Drug 
Administration regulates genetic testing, the Federal Trade Commission regulates clinic 
advertising, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services sets payment levels). 
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CDC.60 However, the FCSRCA “fails to give the CDC the authority to 
enforce the data-reporting requirement, and simply outlines a voluntary 
system of licensing that has not been implemented or enforced.”61 Clinics 
that do not report to the CDC face no legal consequences.62 Further, the 
FCSRCA “did not . . . create any mechanism for reporting adverse events 
encountered during fertility treatments.
”63 
The FCSRCA requires that fertility clinics report success rates, which 
are then made publicly available. As a result, providers are incentivized to 
make their clinics appear as successful as possible, so they can attract more 
ART customers. Because the odds of successful pregnancy resulting from 
IVF are so low,64 profit incentives led to the practice of multi-embryonic 
transfers.65 Success rate reporting, combined with the advent of money-
back guarantees,66 drives providers to do what it takes to ensure a greater 
chance of success from one cycle of IVF. This often means “a higher dose 
of fertility drugs, a more invasive egg retrieval, implanting more embryos 
(and possibly having to eliminate some to improve the survival chances of 
the others).”67 
Not only do multi-gestational pregnancies pose many health risks for 
the consumers, multi-gestational pregnancies pose a financial risk to the 
insurer that disincentivizes coverage. Maternity benefits packages generally 
include “coverage for labor and delivery, regardless of the number of 
children.”68 But, for multi-gestational pregnancies, those costs multiply. 
Other countries have recognized the ugly risks of implanting multiple 
                                                          
 60 FRCSA, supra note 42, 42 U.S.C. § 263(a)(1), set out the reporting requirements. The 
reporting results can be accessed through the Centers for Disease Control Website, at 
https://www.cdc.gov/art/nass/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q44Q-HDBW]. The data 
collected includes: patient demographics, obstetric and medical history, infertility diagnoses, 
clinical parameters of the ART procedure used, and information about the resulting 
pregnancies and births. 
 61 Ouellette, supra note 10, at 422. 
 62 Id. at 420. Further, compliance with the reporting requirements was entirely 
voluntary, and no penalties would result from failing to report. See Lee Kuo, Lessons 
Learned from Great Britain’s Human Fertilization and Embryology Act: Should the United 
States Regulate the Fate of Unused Frozen Embryos, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1027, 
1032 (1997). 
 63 Noah, supra note 17, at 615. 
 64 See Davidson, supra note 24, at 151 (“A successful pregnancy occurs only forty to 
fifty percent of the time when a single embryo is transferred for implantation[,]” so “each 
attempt at [in vitro fertilization] is a financial gamble[,]” but “[s]uccess rates increase as the 
number of embryos increase.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 65 Noah, supra note 17, at 626. 
 66 Murray, supra note 15, at 292. 
 67 Id. at 293. See also Note, supra note 7, at 2811 (“[D]octors may transfer excessively 
high numbers of embryos in order to inflate the clinic’s success rate figures without heeding 
the risks to patient health[]”, or “may start fertility treatment . . . before a woman’s infertility 
can be confirmed.”). 
 68 Davidson, supra note 24, at 142. 
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embryos, and have limited the number of embryos to two-to-four per cycle 
to reduce the chance of multi-gestational pregnancy.69 Many of the same 
countries provide coverage for IVF, which shows that they have “lower 
rates of embryo implantation and lower rates of multi-fetal pregnancy than 
the United States.”70 The United States has taken no steps to reduce the 
incentives that lead to multi-embryonic transfers. But, by creating a system 
that reduces multi-embryonic transfer, the United States could create 
greater confidence in the effectiveness of ART treatment, and ensure that 
ART patients are exposed to fewer of the health risks that multi-embryonic 
transfers pose. 
The FCSRCA did call for the development of a model program for 
certifying labs and creating criteria and procedures for ART programs.71 
And the CDC developed the program; however, “since responsibility for 
implementing such programs is a state function, no national certification 
program was actually implemented . . . for financial . . . reasons.”72 But 
even in the program that the CDC developed, there were no minimum 
safety requirements for ART procedures.73 Because there is no federal 
program that explicitly oversees and provides guidance for ART providers, 
it can be difficult for consumers to compare clinics without relying on 
professional regulators that lack the capacity to enforce their standards. 
The FCSRCA, though well-intentioned, is inadequate to protect ART 
customers. It does not establish clear, mandatory standards for clinic 
licensing. First, it does not establish minimal safety requirements for 
physicians and clinics. Second, it does not establish any oversight body. 
Third, it has no enforcement mechanism. And finally, it does not provide 
any consumer protections to ART customers from ART providers. Overall, 
it fails to address and resolve the key problems posed by the ART market. 
And though there are other federal healthcare programs that may reach IVF, 
“there are multiple overseeing authorities,” which “has resulted in 
inconsistencies, duplication, and . . . inappropriate regulations.”74 As a 
result, insurers do not feel comfortable covering ART, and ART consumers 
suffer. Should Congress pass legislation that relates to ART generally, or 
IVF specifically, it must create a body that can oversee licensing, safety 
standards, accounting and records, and policies of IVF clinics in the United 
States. 
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VI. THE (INADEQUACY OF) STATE REGULATION 
As it stands, the IVF market in the United States is governed by “a 
patchwork of private insurance and enterprise, state law, and federal 
regulation.”75 As wielders of police powers, states generally have authority 
over family law and health.76 And states have a large interest in regulating 
IVF as a matter of public health, because of the high risk of multiple 
pregnancies. Not only do multiple pregnancies mean increased cost, but 
they also generally result in adverse health events for both the newborn and 
the pregnant individual.77 Still, states have largely abdicated that 
responsibility when it comes to ART, failing to implement safety standards 
or model programs for IVF clinics.78 A Washington Post article from 2015 
noted that states do not regulate “how many children may be conceived 
from one donor, what types of medical information or updates must be 
supplied by donors, which genetic tests may be performed on embryos, how 
many fertilized eggs may be placed in a woman or how old a donor can 
be.”79 
Some states have indirectly regulated IVF by mandating insurance 
coverage for the procedure. However, in states that have statutory mandates 
for IVF coverage, requirements vary widely from “age restrictions for 
patients who seek the service, number of employees necessary for 
employers to be covered under the legislation, residence of the insured, 
number of in vitro cycles covered, number of embryos transferred per cycle 
or lifetime, whether donor eggs may be used, and lifetime monetary 
caps.”80 Some states only allow for insurance providers to offer IVF 
coverage “where a woman’s eggs are fertilized with her husband’s 
sperm.”81 
Though variance in state regulation is understandable, given the 
different preferences in each state, when it comes to healthcare and 
insuring, the differences can have harmful results. For example, “when an 
individual works in one state but the insurance plan is from another state, 
she is not necessarily covered by the state plan mandating insurance 
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companies to cover the procedure.”82 Meaning, a woman who lives and 
works in Chicago, whose employer uses Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Missouri, will be subject to the limitations that Missouri places on ART and 
IVF. Later, I will explore how this may provide Congress justification to 
regulate the ART market, because it implicates the commerce clause. 
VII. PRIVATE REGULATORS, PUBLIC COST 
The United States ART market is regulated primarily by private health 
provider associations, namely the Society for Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (“SART”) and the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine (“ASRM”).83 Moreover, until passage of the FCSRCA, data 
collection on ART rested on those two organizations.84 Membership in 
these organizations is entirely voluntary,85 but, as SART notes on its 
membership page, joining them links providers with potential ART 
customers seamlessly.86 
It is important to note that, although they have been involved in 
passing limited legislation87 and work in collaboration with public entities,88 
SART and ASRM are private entities. SART is incorporated as an entity 
separate from ASRM, but members are required to join ASRM too.89 
Members pay an annual fee of three hundred dollars, a data collection fee of 
five hundred dollars, and other additional fees.90 That private regulators 
dominate the industry is not surprising. The National Institutes of Health 
has limited ability to fund human embryonic research, consequently, IVF 
was primarily developed privately, as a consumer health service, as 
opposed to a research endeavor.91 Private development (combined with the 
political lightning rod of reproductive rights) meant that IVF could escape 
government oversight and regulation.92 And without the watchful eye of a 
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regulatory overseer, ART clinics may put profits and reputation of success 
above all else, even if it means their patients suffer adverse consequences 
from higher doses of fertility drugs, multi-fetal pregnancies, or invasive 
procedures.93 
SART is not an accrediting agency, and only controls the behavior of 
its members.94 The most significant role that both SART and ASRM have is 
issuing practice guidelines to their membership. A Business Insider report 
notes that practice committees meet to write opinions on new ART 
procedures, treatments, and research, and to issue guidance.95 However, 
“[n]ew procedures do not have to be approved before they can be 
performed in clinics,” and providers do not have to adhere to the practice 
committee guidance.96 In fact, current data shows that most fertility clinics 
do not follow SART or ASRM guidance.97 A representative of the 
California-based Center for Genetics and Society noted that “[t]here are 
enough clinics that quite openly flout professional guidelines that we really 
do need to start thinking about public policy in this area.”98 SART may 
promulgate guidelines that would mitigate the public health and cost risks 
associated with IVF, but, as the data shows, most fertility clinics do not 
heed those guidelines. 
But, despite the brazen violations of their guidelines by ART 
providers, there is little SART and ASRM can do in terms of enforcement. 
The most drastic measure that SART can take in response to transgressions 
by ART providers is to revoke membership.99 But, “[t]his does nothing to 
improve the quality of a clinic for which membership status is not 
important.”100 As much as SART and ASRM may cherish their role as the 
overseers of the ART industry in the United States, they are clearly having 
little effect on increasing the quality of assisted reproductive healthcare. If 
membership (and, by extension, adherence to membership requirements) is 
optional, and their members are not reprimanded for the harm they cause to 
vulnerable ART customers, something else must be done. 
Customers navigating the ART industry deserve regulation that clears 
the landscape, so they can find, access, and benefit from quality care. 
Ouellette identifies four key issues resulting from the lack of ART 
regulation in the United States, all of which affect ART consumers: 
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[1] Poor quality clinics will remain open and will propagate morally 
questionable and/or sloppy clinical practices, whether on purpose or 
unintentionally. Some of these cases will make headlines while 
others will go unpublicized. [2] The availability, reliability, and 
clarity of ART success rate data will continue to be poor so that 
consumers will have difficulty determining the quality of individual 
clinics. [3] Clinics that cut corners on voluntary data reporting, 
advertising, and practice guidelines will achieve commercial success 
at the expense of better quality clinics with whom they compete. [4] 
Poor quality clinics will harm the reputation of the field of ART as a 
whole.101 
An effective regulatory scheme will: promulgate standard operating 
procedures and expectations for care, adequately supervise clinics to ensure 
they are meeting those standards, keep detailed records, make the records 
available to consumers, create limits on advertising, and work to ensure that 
ART has a reputation for reliability in the United States. 
VIII. THE GAPS OF THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME 
Despite the horrifying consequences that can happen in the 
unregulated market, patients who suffer harm as a result of the lack of 
oversight of the ART market will find no hope in the current legal regime. 
Despite having theoretical options in medical malpractice law, contract law, 
and negligence tort law, courts are not interested in providing relief. In 
these traditional areas of the law, courts lack the experience or imagination 
necessary to handle the nuance of cases in which reproductive harm (that is 
largely emotional) is at the epicenter of the case. 
A. Medical Malpractice 
Unfortunately, traditional medical malpractice regimes do not 
incentivize providers to align their behavior to provide a higher level of 
care to ART patients. Fox notes that “[m]alpractice actions . . . call for . . . 
more tangible setbacks to the injured party’s person or possessions[,]” and 
that courts generally do not offer relief when providers “negligently 
deprive, impose, or confound procreation[,]” because there is often not a 
physical harm or property loss.102 Since medical malpractice generally 
requires physical harm, in cases where sperm or ova are damaged, 
destroyed, lost, misappropriated, or otherwise harmed, relief is not possible 
from medical malpractice. This means that, even if ART consumers could 
access relief through tort law, medical malpractice insurance would not pay 
out, and relief would be limited to the personal assets of the provider. The 
current legal options do not provide ART consumers with adequate 
protection, given the stakes of reproductive medicine. 
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As a result, ART consumers who suffer “switched sperm, lost 
embryos, and misdiagnosed fetuses”103 have no legal recourse, and must 
simply tolerate it, because there is no physical harm (or at least barely 
detectable physical harm). Though they may be able to state a claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, “[c]ourts hardly ever let plaintiffs 
recover for standalone emotional harm.”104 There are currently “twenty 
states [that] refuse to consider the merits of [] professional-malpractice 
actions against forced procreation.” That is, when providers fail to provide 
testing (or miscommunicate testing), which results in a child being born 
with an anomaly, there is no recourse against the provider.105 Though many 
genetic anomalies may be harmless, in cases of serious genetic illnesses, 
ART consumers may be seriously harmed by that negligence, and they lack 
the ability to seek compensation for that harm. 
B. Contract, Tort, and Property Claims 
Contract cases are complicated by the fact that many ART providers 
decline to promise specific results,106 so it’s difficult to definitively say that 
they violated the terms of their agreements. And because many of the harms 
are emotional, lacking an economic or physical component, tort law often 
declines a remedy as well.107 Property law doesn’t recognize the “symbolic 
value of . . . eggs and embryos or the costly procedures required to extract 
or create them.”108 Often, reproductive misconduct deprives patients of the 
ability to procreate in the future, and courts are not yet able to deal with 
that. Though it is outside the scope of this article, the lack of an adequate 
cause of action for reproductive harm is reflective of the private, market-
driven, and unregulated ART industry in the United States. Providers can 
run amok, and ART consumers, lacking adequate protection from the 
government, are harmed. Legislation that set up a regulatory body could 
also introduce causes of action for ART consumers who experience harm 
resulting from negligent reproductive healthcare providers. 
IX. THE UK MODEL 
In the United Kingdom, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
of 1990 (“HFE Act”) empowered the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (“HFEA”) to license, oversee, and promulgate codes of practice 
for in vitro fertilization.109 The HFE Act was developed after an extensive 
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investigation into the public health implications of ART, conducted 
subsequent to the first successful “test tube” birth in the United 
Kingdom.110 The United Kingdom opted for a streamlined and authoritative 
approach, where the United States opted to allow the industry to develop 
through the market. Having an expert authority regulating the industry has 
resulted in high-quality research and practice, putting the United Kingdom 
at the forefront of the ART field.111 By adopting a similar framework, the 
United States could increase the predictability and safety of in vitro 
fertilization, reduce adverse incentives, make it more appealing for insurers 
to provide coverage for in vitro fertilization, and increase the quality and 
amount of research that advances ART and infertility care. 
A. Licensing 
HFEA is the sole body authorized to oversee all fertility clinics and 
human embryo research in the United Kingdom.112 It issues licenses to any 
clinics and laboratories operating in the ART field, which fall into one of 
three categories: “licenses for fertility treatment, licenses for embryo 
storage, and licenses for research on human embryos or gametes.”113 
Whereas in the United States, accreditation is an optional undertaking for 
an ART clinic, British law mandates that any embryology or fertilization 
enterprise get and maintain a license.114 
The HFE Act sets out general conditions for all licensees, as well as 
specific conditions applying to the categories.115 The general conditions for 
licensees alone are far more extensive than the CDC’s success rate 
reporting requirements. The HFE Act requires that licensees maintain 
adequate books and records, and supply copies or extracts to HFEA upon 
request.116 The HFE Act also mandates: 
that any member or employee of the Authority, on production, if so 
required, of a document identifying the person as such, shall at all 
reasonable times be permitted to enter those premises and inspect 
them (which includes inspecting any equipment or records and 
observing any activity).117 
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Licensees submit themselves to rigorous oversights by a public body, 
and inspections at any time. In contrast, SART member clinics in the 
United States only have to be inspected every two years.118 
An anti-regulation argument against the kind of oversight that the HFE 
Act employs might suggest that worrying about inspections prevent a clinic 
from being able to operate freely. ART industry actors in the United 
Kingdom suggest that this is not the case. In a press release, the British 
Fertility Society (“BFS”) expressed its belief that the HFE Act “has been of 
enormous reassurance to the public and to those scientists and clinicians 
working in what is often perceived as one of the most controversial areas of 
medical practice.”119 The BFS also noted that the IVF clinics in the United 
Kingdom licensed by the HFEA, “have worked effectively for many years 
within this framework, providing the highest quality of care for patients.”120 
B. Guidance and the Code of Practice 
The HFE Act mandates that HFEA promulgate a Code of Practice 
(“Code”).121 The Code is drafted by the HFEA, approved (or disapproved) 
by the Secretary of State, and, after approval, sent to Parliament.122 The 
HFE Act notes a number of potentially appropriate subjects for the Code, 
and the HFEA has done its best to issue detailed guidance.123 Though 
violating of the Code may not be enough to start proceedings against the 
offender, a licensing committee may review whether any licensing 
conditions were violated and may consider the Code violation in its 
determination.124 
The Code allows HFEA to “establish[] boundaries beyond which 
treatment and research may not venture, define[] technologies to be 
licensed, and determine[] the legal status of the resulting children.”
125 To 
issue up-to-date and comprehensive guidance, the HFEA employees a 
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“horizon scanning panel”, which serves to identify “new developments that 
may impact on the field of ART or embryo research.”126 It uses “issues 
identified in journal articles, conferences and/or suggestions and advice 
from international experts in the field of ART and embryo research via 
internet communication, questionnaires and a meeting once a year.”127 
There is not legislation in the United States nor guidance from the CDC on 
what new treatment or technology may be used on patients. 
C. Register 
In the United States, information collection by the CDC is strictly 
limited to success rate data.128 The HFE Act requires that the HFEA 
maintain a register of any information relating to “the provision of 
treatment services for any identifiable individual, the keeping or use of the 
gametes of any identifiable individual or of an embryo taken from any 
identifiable woman,” or if the information “shows that any identifiable 
individual was, or may have been, born in consequence of treatment 
services.”129 Those who may be concerned about a lack of privacy can sleep 
easily knowing that no one in the HFEA may disclose any of the 
information in the register, except to the Registrar General or other 
employees of HFEA.130 Not only does this register allow the HFEA to 
monitor for potential violations of the Code or of the HFE Act, it also 
facilitates new and enlightening statistics about the state of IVF in the 
United Kingdom. In the United States, the lack of information leaves most 
of us in the dark when it comes to the ART industry. 
D. Enforcement 
In the United States, there are “no legal consequences for non-
accredited [clinics]”, nor is there a “consumer-recognized seal of approval 
or standard symbol that conveys that any minimum standards of quality 
have been met.”131 HFEA, on the other hand, is authorized to “refuse, 
revoke, or suspend a license,” and may submit clinics and laboratories that 
violate the HFE Act to the Director of Public Prosecutions.132 If convicted, 
violators “may be charged with a prison term of up to ten years and a 
fine.”133 For violations of HFEA’s Code of Practice, licensees may have 
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their licenses reviewed and revoked.134 During premises inspections, an 
HFEA inspector is authorized to take possession of anything, which may be 
relevant to a license violation or that may be used in evidence in 
proceedings, and may take steps to preserve anything necessary.135 The 
HFE Act also authorizes Justices of the Peace to issue warrants on the oath 
of a member or employee of HFEA, given reasonable grounds for 
suspecting a violation of the HFE Act.136 
X. SCHEMES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES 
The per capita usage of IVF procedures is far higher in other 
developed countries such as Australia, France, Japan, and Germany.137 By 
using social security reimbursement strategies or cost-sharing schemes, 
they are able to increase the number of people who are able to take 
advantage of new ART technology to grow their families.138 Like the 
United Kingdom, Australia enforces standards with criminal sanctions.139 
These countries also place important limits on IVF that reduce the 
likelihood of multi-fetal pregnancies and increase the safety of IVF 
practice, even if they do not have quite as rigorous a framework as the 
United Kingdom.140 
In Germany, for example, The Embryo Protection Act of 1990 limits 
the number of embryos that may be collected for fertilization to three.141 
Germany uses a managed care system, where medical innovation must be 
evaluated for coverage through an application that “must describe the 
usefulness of the new procedure, its medical necessity, and its cost-
effectiveness compared to already covered care.”142 The Joint Federal 
Committee must, in particular, adopt guidelines for “medical services in 
cases of infertility.”143 
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Though the German regulations do not reach quite as far into the ART 
industry as those in the United Kingdom, they establish far more control 
than the United States. Germany places limits on the number of ova that can 
be harvested, and creates an oversight process for evaluating innovative 
treatments and procedures. By doing this， Germany reduces the number 
of multi-fetal pregnancies144 and ensures that all the procedures being 
practiced on German ART consumers are adequate, safe, and thoroughly 
tested. 
XI. A BETTER REGULATORY SCHEME 
The comprehensive regulatory framework of the HFE Act and HFEA 
protects British ART consumers from opportunistic ART providers much 
more effectively than the regulations in the United States. The HFE Act 
also has consequences in place when ART providers engage in 
inappropriate conduct, which poses a risk to British ART consumers. Why 
can’t ART consumers in the United States be protected in a similar way? 
As previously noted, reproductive healthcare tends to be a political 
lightning rod that members of Congress want to avoid, but there’s another 
explanation. 
The private regulators that were so involved in the drafting and 
passage of the FCSRCA and “the multibillion-dollar fertility industry in 
America mount[] powerful lobbying forces against occasional calls for 
regulation.”145 The United States healthcare is market-driven: “[s]elf-
regulation is the longstanding tradition for medical professionals.”146 By 
contrast, the National Health Service (“NHS”) funds most healthcare in the 
United Kingdom. The NHS covers “health care and social costs for children 
born of ART, even if those costs are extraordinary as a result of the 
actualized risks of privately funded ART procedures.”147 And though 
private health providers may set their own rates,148under certain conditions, 
IVF is covered under the NHS.149 
Still, the physical and psychological health of uniquely vulnerable 
consumers should be more important to members of Congress, and they 
should act. Justification for legislation of this kind could potentially be 
found in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,150 given that unequal 
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treatment of IVF in one state could affect the IVF market in a neighboring 
state.151 
Currently, data shows that most clinics in the United States do not 
follow SART and ASRM guidelines.152 There are no teeth behind the 
private regulators’ guidance; the most that SART and ASRM can do to a 
noncompliant clinic is to revoke their membership status.153 Perhaps an 
aggrieved ART consumer could bring a malpractice suit, but it may never 
make it to the court, either because it doesn’t adequately meet the 
requirements of medical malpractice,154 or because it’s settled. At the end of 
the day, the clinic faces no consequences, and can keep attracting patients 
via an ill-advised success rate system. 
An ideal framework of ART regulation will be independent, will take 
into account patients, providers, and the public, and will be free from 
political, religious, or moral agendas.155 If the United States were to adopt a 
framework modeled after the HFE Act and HFEA, it should be sure to 
adopt a licensing requirements, an inspection system, and an enforcement 
mechanism. By adopting those provisions, ART providers would have clear 
licensing conditions to follow, as opposed to optional accreditation. Clear 
standards of practice could be promulgated to all fertility and embryology 
entities in the United States, as opposed to the SART membership 
standards. And, those standards could be backed up by enforcement 
mechanisms, both civil and criminal. 
XII. JUSTIFICATION FOR REGULATION 
Congress can regulate channels of commerce (like common carriers 
and motels), instrumentalities of commerce (things moved through 
interstate commerce), and activities having significant impact on interstate 
commerce (like pricing goods that may be moved through interstate 
commerce).156 Because of the way the insurance market operates state-by-
state, and because ART customers may travel to specific ART providers in 
other states, the current ART market implicates the commerce clause, 
which would provide Congress justification for regulating it.157 Some states 
disincentivize use of ART by single mothers and gay couples. This doesn’t 
mean that those people will remain childless, but, more likely, it means that 
they will travel to another state to get it. Further, some states limit the ways 
that insurance companies can cover ART. If a woman lives in Illinois, but 
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her employer provides Blue Cross Blue Shield of Missouri, she is subject to 
the limitation that Missouri places on insurers. Because of the way laws in 
one state can affect residents of another state, Congress could suggest that 
ART is an instrumentality of commerce, and pass regulation that improves 
the quality of ART care for consumers and provides an enforcement 
mechanism for reprimanding substandard care. 
Without comprehensive legislations, Congress could instead make 
infertility treatment an essential health benefit under the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). Currently, the ACA mandates coverage 
for infant and maternity care.158 By making infertility treatment an essential 
health benefit, Congress would enable insurance companies to set limits on 
procedures and standards of treatment. Insurance companies “could use the 
industry information from ASRM and SART to set guidelines for 
reimbursements and then mandate that coverage be provided only for 
clinics that report according to federal law or adhere strictly to professional 
guidelines.”159 Insurance companies could then link clinic reimbursement 
“to a requirement that physicians either follow industry guidelines or justify 
why they did not follow the guidelines.”160 So, by mandating coverage for 
infertility care, Congress could improve the standards of care for IVF, 
artificial insemination, gamete Intrafallopian transfer, and other ART 
services that are inherently risky. 
This may not happen, given the politicized nature of the ACA in 
particular and health care in general.161 Congress may not be moved to 
increase Essential Health Benefits under the ACA any time soon. That said, 
if Congress fails to act in the best interests of ART consumers in the United 
States, insurance companies could pick up the slack. It is to insurance 
companies benefits to ensure that healthy children are born through IVF, so 
they will not have to pay for as expensive infant care resulting from multi-
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Oversight of ART generally, and IVF in particular, would be 
beneficial to the ART market in the United States. It could create a reliable, 
predictable market for consumers and insurers. It would create protections 
for consumers who currently lack legal recourse for harms suffered through 
ART. Insurance companies could use the guidance provided by a federal 
regulatory body to determine which procedures are best suited for coverage, 
which could protect consumers from undergoing ineffective or unreliable 
procedures. 
Most importantly, regulation would increase trust of ART and use of 
ART, by normalizing the process and making it more familiar to the public. 
By regulating the market, Congress could create a partnership between 
ART consumers, ART providers, and the public, thereby creating a forum 
for public debate about infertility treatment and the ART market.162 IVF 
provides hope to infertile couples all over the world, but if providers’ 
interest is placed above consumers’ interest and public health, generally, 
it’s less likely that anyone will want to take advantage of the technological 
advance. 
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